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1. INTRODUCTION
I want to offer some thoughts on the implications of Justice Kennedy's
controlling opinion inParents Involved, which essentially was a four-to-one-to-four
case.' Justice Kennedy's opinion will likely come to define the terms upon which
public school districts, school administrators, and state officials that are still
inclined to pursue school integration can implement and maintain the practice. The
single most important statement in the plurality opinion of Justice Roberts came at
its conclusion: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race."' My point of departure is Justice Kennedy's
remarks to this solution. In reply, Kennedy stated, "Fifty years of experience since
Brown v. Board of Education should teach us that the problem before us defies so
*Professor of Law, Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow, and Director of the Hudson & Holland Scholars
Program, Indiana University-Bloomington. B.S. Indiana University, 1978, J.D. Yale Law School, 1982.
The author would like to thank Stephen Reynolds and Dominique A. McGee for their excellent research
which contributed greatly to these comments.
1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
2. Id. at 2768 (plurality opinion).
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easy a solution."3 Kennedy also noted that we have "generations" of experience
with the use of racial classifications to foster school integration.4 While my heart
and sympathies lie with Justice Breyer's dissent, I assert that Justice Kennedy's
opinion constitutionalizes the American experience with school desegregation, not
our hopes and dreams about it.
11. Two GENERATIONS OF EXPERIENCE WITH SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND
INTEGRATION
School desegregation and integration6 have shaped my educational and
academic careers for two generations. I was born two years after the Court rendered
its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education7 (Brown I). In the fall of 1961, 1
enrolled in an all-black neighborhood elementary school in the Indianapolis Public
School District (IPS). This was the beginning of the third year that the public
schools in Prince Edwards County, Virginia, were closed in order to prevent their
integration.8 My parents were both public school teachers in IPS from the 1950s
until the 1980s when they retired. My father was the head of the math department
at the all-black high school the very high school he was class president of when
he graduated in 1945. My mother was a teacher in an all-black elementary school
in IPS-coincidentally, the very elementary school she attended when young. In
1968, the United States Department of Justice filed a complaint alleging that IPS's
schools were unconstitutionally segregated. 9 This eventually led to a consent decree
in 1971.1° Because of that decree, both of my parents were reassigned to
predominantly white schools.
In 1966, my parents moved our family from inner-city Indianapolis to the
suburban school district of Washington Township. I entered fifth grade two years
before the Supreme Court's monumental school desegregation opinion, Green v.
County School Board." In that decision, the Court commanded public school
districts that had operated dual school systems to desegregate immediately. 2
Washington Township schools were reputed to be among the best public schools
in the state of Indiana; however, black students never constituted more than 10%
of the student body of my elementary, junior high, or high school. From the time
we moved, I never had another African-American teacher during the rest of my
3. Id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (internal citation
omitted).
4. See id. at 2792.
5. See id at 2800 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. I use the term desegregation to refer to mandatory desegregation to remedy a constitutional
violation of de jure segregation. I use the term integration to refer to efforts by local or state public
school authorities to bring students of different racial and ethnic backgrounds together in the absence
of a constitutional violation.
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Those schools remained closed until the Supreme Court addressed the situation in 1964. See
Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 222-25 (1964).
9. See United States v. Bd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (S.D. Ind. 1973).
10. See Kevin Brown, Recent Developments in the Termination ofSchool Desegregation Decrees,
26 IND. L. REv. 867, 887 (1993).
11. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
12. See id. at 441 42.
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elementary and secondary school education. My parents told my two brothers and
me that the reason we were moving from our all-black neighborhood which
consisted of our all-black friends, classmates, and teachers to go to the suburban
schools was that they wanted us to have a better education than we could get in
IPS. 13
As a side note, the elementary school I attended in Washington Township
closed in the early 1990s. Before it did, however, the student population became
predominately black. In 1982, eight years after I graduated from high school,
official statistics put the percentage of white students in Washington Township at
74%, with 24% black students, 2% Asians, and virtually no Hispanics. 14 Twenty
years later the percentage of Asians stayed the same, but the percentage of white
students had decreased to 48%, the percentage of black students had risen to 39%,
and the percentage of Hispanic students had risen to 7%.15
Beyond experiencing the school integration process as a student, my academic
research career has primarily involved writing about school desegregation and
integration. I joined the faculty of Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington
in 1987 and began to offer theories about how to determine when courts should
release a public school district from its obligation to desegregate its schools. 6 I
wrote about African-American Immersion Schools in 1993." In so doing, I argued
that the best form of education was true multicultural education in a racially- and
ethnically-diverse school.'" However, it was increasingly clear that such schools
were unobtainable. Because the federal courts were abandoning their efforts to
desegregate public schools, those concerned about the education of black kids
would seek innovative ways to improve their education in these increasingly
racially isolated schools. 19 Increasing efforts by public school officials to reorganize
education around the African-American experience should be expected. In the last
fifteen years, we have witnessed the creation and expansion of a wave of
Afrocentric charter schools. In Parents Involved, Justice Thomas's concurring
opinion sought to turn the motivating logic for these schools on its head. Rather
than view them as natural by-products of the abandoning of school desegregation
efforts, Thomas asserted that "[t]he Seattle school board itself must believe that
racial mixing is not necessary to black [academic] achievement," because Seattle
operated an African-American Academy that was founded in an effort to "increase
13. For further discussion of this episode in my life, see Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court
Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1992).
14. METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP, RACIAL PERCENTAGES,
1982-83, http://www.msdwt.kl 2.in.us/info/images/Slide9.jpg (last visited May 7, 2008).
15. METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP, RACIAL PERCENTAGES,
2002 03, http://www.msdwt.kl2.in.us/info/images/SlidelO.jpg (last visited May 7, 2008).
16. See Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary
Status Basedon the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1105, 1162 63
(1990) (offering additional factors for courts to consider in determining whether a school district has
achieved "unitary" status).
17. See Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need hnmersion Schools? : The Paradoxes Created
by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 lowA L. REV. 813 (1993).
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academic achievement."2 I first started publishing articles addressing equal
protection issues related to school integration programs in 1997,21 shortly after the
decision by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Sheffv. O'Neill.22 By 2003, 1 was
publishing articles indicating that increasing school choice-including school
vouchers-was inevitable, in part because of our failure as a country to integrate
the public schools.23
111. THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE SCOPE OF THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND
INTEGRATION ISSUES ADDRESSED IN PARENTS INVOLVED
As a prelude to a discussion of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved,
it is important to recognize the limited scope of the school desegregation and
integration issues that the Court addressed. This decision was of little interest to
major urban school districts in our country including Cleveland, Dallas, Denver,
Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, and St Louis. Regardless of the political will of the
voters or of public education officials, the percentage of white students in these
public school districts is not enough to make school desegregation meaningful for
a number of their students.24 Chroniclers of the Supreme Court's school
desegregation jurisprudence would likely point to the five-to-four decision of the
Court in the 1974 case of Milliken v. Bradley as the opinion that effectively ended
the hope of school desegregation for almost all major urban school districts.
2
Therefore, those who pursued the dream of an America that desegregated or
integrated the urban public schools have had over thirty years to mourn the demise
of this dream.
Parents Involved also does not apply to those school districts that do not have
the political will to pursue integration policies. No one who dreamed of a means for
the federal courts to compel recalcitrant public school officials and state
governments to end racial isolation of blacks and Latinos would have read the
20. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2777 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. See Kevin Brown, The -Implications of the Equal Protection Clause for the Mandatory
Integration of Public School Students, 29 CONN. L. REV. 999 (1997).
22. 678 A.2d 1267, 1290 (Conn. 1996) (holding that the legislature must take responsibility to
remedy de jure and de facto segregation in public schools).
23. See KEVIN BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA: FOUR
PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION (2005); Kevin D. Brown, Reexamination of
the Benefit of Publicly Funded Private Education for African-American Students in a Post-
Desegregation Era, 36 IND. L. REV. 477, 507 (2003)..
24. In Bradley v. Milliken, the district court reviewed statistics that suggested there were too few
white students enrolled in Detroit's public schools to relieve segregation. 338 F. Supp. 582, 585 87
(E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). In 1970, white
students comprised 36.2% of Detroit's public school enrollment of289,743 students. Id. at 585-86. For
a list of school districts that have terminated their school desegregation decrees and observed a
continued decline in the percentage of white students, see GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF
SEGREGATION 33-35 & 35 tbl. 15 (2006), available at http://www.civilrightsprojectucla.edu/research/
deseg/Racial Transformation.pdf Selected percentages of white students in some of these school
districts are the following: Boston (14%), Cleveland (18%), Dade County (10%), Dallas (6%), Denver
County (20%), Detroit (3%), Houston (9%), Kansas City (130%), and St. Louis (16%). Id. at 35 tbl. 15.
25. See 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974) ("[A]bsent an interdistrict violation, there is no basis for an
interdistrict remedy .. ").
[Vol. 59: 735
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Parents Involved decision with any real interest. Such dreamers knew long before
the Court accepted certiorari on this case26 that federal-court-mandated school
desegregation, spawned by Brown 127 and its progeny, had long since peaked. The
Supreme Court's desegregation termination decisions in the 1990s made it
abundantly clear that there was no desire to spark a new round of constitutionally
mandated school desegregation.28 In fact, those who would argue for the use of
federalj udicial power to produce desegregated schools including me have long
been cognizant of the eventual limitations of that approach. At the apex of school
desegregation in the 1980s, 63% of the black students were still attending
predominantly minority schools.2 9 The percentage of blacks attending schools that
were hypersegregated-those with at least 90% minority students never fell
below the 32% mark it reached in 1988.30 Both of these figures have been climbing
for the past twenty years. 31 Thus, those who dreamed that the Constitution could
bring about desegregated schools have now had over twenty years to mourn the
apparent demise of that dream.
The issues raised in Parents Involvedwere limited to those school districts that
have both the political will and the racial and ethnic demographics to foster some
school integration. The Civil Rights Project reported that in 2005 the percentage of
black students attending predominantly minority schools was up to 730%,32 and the
percentage attending hypersegregated schools was up to 38%.33 For Latinos, the
corresponding figures-78%34 and 3 9% 35 respectively-stand at their highest levels
since recordkeeping of them began in 1968. Even the most ardent school
desegregation proponent and I would consider myself one of them must
recognize that the changing racial and ethnic demographics of America's public
schools has also been outstripping the efforts of even the most committed to the
26. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006) (mem.).
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995) ("[O]ur cases recognize that local autonomy
of school districts is a vital national tradition and that a district court must strive to restore state and
local authorities to the control of a school system ...." (internal citation omitted)); Freeman v. Pitts,
503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) ("Partial relinquishment ofjudicial control, wherejustified by the facts of the
case, can be an important and significant step in fulfilling the district court's duty to return the
operations and control of schools to local authorities."); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247
(1991) ("[F]ederal supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary measure to remedy
past discrimination."). Noted constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky said as much on a number of
occasions. See P. Michael Mahoney & Scott R. Paccagnini, Declare Victory and Go Home: The
Practical Ramifications of the Seventh Circuit's Interpretation of Missouri v. Jenkins in School
Desegregation Cases, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 683, 687-88 (2004) (discussing the impact of statements
by Professor Chemerinsky that the Supreme Court's opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins amounted to a
statement to federal courts that they should "declare victory in school desegregation cases and go
home").
29. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, UNIV. OF CAL., L.A.,
HISTORIc REVERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION
STRATEGIES 28 tbl.10 (2007), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/
reversals resegneed.pdf.
30. See id. at 33 tbl.14.
31. Id. at 28 tbl.10, 33 tbl.14.
32. Id. at 28 tbl.10.
33. Id. at 33 tbl.14.
34. Id. at 34tbl.16.
35. Id. at 35 tbl.17.
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integration of public schools. In 1968, white students comprised over 80% ofpublic
school students.36 By 2005, however, white public school students comprised only
57% of the total, while the proportion of Latino students had increased to 20%,
followed closely by black students at 17%.3 With these limitations, Parents
Involved was never about the dream of desegregating or integrating our public
schools nationwide; it was only about trying to hold on to the dwindling amount of
school desegregation and integration that currently exists.
IV. ANALYSIS OF KENNEDY'S OPINION
There are two aspects of Kennedy's opinion I want to focus on. First, Kennedy
provides a different rationale for the integration of public schools than that for
desegregation. The rationale for integration is based on the notion that all school
children will benefit from integration. 8 This contrasts sharply with the rationale for
desegregation, which was viewed as only benefiting black students. 9 As a result,
all students-including white students-will benefit from integration. Second,
Justice Kennedy proposes two different paths for public school authorities
interested in consciously pursuing school integration. Kennedy allows public school
authorities wide discretion to pursue integration, so long as they are not employing
individual racial classifications of students.4" If these measures are inadequate,
Kennedy also allows for a limited use of individual racial classifications to advance
the compelling state interest of diversity or of preventing racial isolation.4
A. All Students Will Benefit fom School Integration
Kennedy begins his opinion by stating, "The Nation's schools strive to teach
that our strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting
in commitment to the freedom of all."42 This utilitarian justification for integration
places the emphasis on diversity benefiting our nation as a whole and in particular,
all public school students. This is a far cry from the justification for school
desegregation that existed when I attended integrated elementary and secondary
schools. At that time, whether dealing with school integration or desegregation, the
country lived with the language justifying school desegregation from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Brown .43
36. Id. at 15.
37. Id. at 16 tbl.2.
38. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
39. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485-86 (1992) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown
1), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)).
40. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
41. Id. at 2792-93.
42. Id. at 2788.
43. Specifically, the Brown ICourt noted, "To separate [black children] from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
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Justice Kennedy authored the opinion for the Court in Freeman v. Pitts44-the
Court's second school desegregation termination decision. In addressing the
desegregation termination issues presented in Freeman, Justice Kennedy noted
early that
[t]he duty and responsibility of a school district once
segregated by law is to take all steps necessary to eliminate the
vestiges of the unconstitutional dejure system. This is required in
order to ensure that the principal wrong of the dejure system, the
injuries and stigma inflicted upon the race disfavored by the
violation, is no longer present.4"
Kennedy then revisited Chief Justice Warren's unanimous opinion for the Court in
Brown Iin order to properly elucidate the injuries derived from dejure segregation
that school desegregation remedies were intended to cure. Kennedy quoted the
passages from Warren's opinion that specifically articulated the harm of
segregation: "To separate [black students] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."46
Kennedy also quoted the portion of Warren's opinion in Brown I that
approvingly quoted a lower court in Kansas:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. . . .[T]he
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting
the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of negro children ... .
44. 503 U.S. at 471.
45. Id. at 485.
46. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The social science evidence cited by the Court was specifically intended to prove that
segregation produced apsychological harm to African Americans. See Brown!, 347 U.S. at 494 & n. 11.
47. Id. at 486 (second alteration in original) (quoting Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494) (internal quotation
marks omitted). As I have noted in a prior article,
I do not wish to be perceived as voicing the proposition that the Supreme
Court was wrong in striking down dejure segregation in 1954. It seems to me that
only a fool would take such an outlandish position. As an African-American law
professor, it is obvious that had the Court not struck down dejure segregation in
Brown 1, 1 would not be in the position to write this article. I extol the valor that
the Court exhibited in breathing life into the moral imperative of equality
enshrined in America's most important legal documents. As a decision to strike
down de jure segregation, Brown I should be looked upon and revered as a
fundamental effort by the Supreme Court that sparked a historic effort by
American society to attempt to break with its racially oppressive past. Without
question, the opinion helped to open doors for African-Americans that prior to it
were permanently barred. Certainly there were extra-legal implications for an
opinion like Brown I, which made it important for the Court to reach unanimity.
Additionally, considerations about the inflammatory nature of the subject matter
may have caused the Court[,] quite correctly[,] to write the opinion the way that
20081
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The Court's opinion in Brown Ijustified remedies for de jure segregation on
the express notion that segregation inflicted psychological and emotional harms on
blacks.48 Despite the rationale advanced by the Supreme Court toj ustify the Court's
de jure segregation jurisprudence, scholars and judges have offered other
interpretations of the meaning behind the Court's jurisprudence.4 9 However, the
debate carried on by scholars and judges about the meaning of Brown I does not
alter the language of the text nor the experiences it produced.
When my white classmates and I had our few discussions about desegregation
or integration of public schools in our integrated classes, it was generally
understood that black students including me were culturally deprived because
of our lack of interracial contact and that school desegregation or integration was
solely for our benefit. Chief Justice Warren's desegregation rationale in Brown I
also cast white students in the role of charitable contributors.5 0 They did not derive
any benefit from the presence of black students in their schools. Rather, they were
donating in-kind benefits in the form of their interracial contact with black students
it did. I am, therefore, willing to concede that the Court delivered the best opinion
possible for the American society as it existed in 1954.
Kevin D. Brown, The Dilemma ofLegal Discourse for Public Educational Responses to the "'Crisis"
Facing African-American Males, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 63, 121 (1994).
48. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
49. Some have argued that Brown I should be understood as an antisubordination opinion. In Part
I of Justice Ginsburg's 2003 dissenting opinion in Gratz v. Bollinger, joined by Justices Breyer and
Souter, she adopted this point of view. See 539 U.S. 244, 301 02 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg argued that in implementing the Equal Protection Clause, "government decisionmakers
may properly distinguish between policies of exclusion and inclusion." Id. at 301. Thus, Ginsburg
reasoned, "[a]ctions designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature[, like African
Americans,] are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched
discrimination and its aftereffects have been extirpated." Id. (citing Stephen L. Carter, When Victims
Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 433-34 (1988) ("[T]o say that two centuries of struggle for the
most basic of civil rights have been mostly about freedom from racial categorization rather than
freedom from racial oppression, is to trivialize the lives and deaths of those who have suffered under
racism.")). At the other end of the spectrum, commentators have argued that Brown I should be
understood to be nothing more than an opinion that declares the simple proposition that it is wrong for
the government to classify and treat individuals as members of racial or ethnic groups. E.g., LINO A.
GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS 30 31
(1976) ("[A]n American citizen... should not be disadvantaged by government because of his race or
ancestry."); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."). There is no need for evidence to support the
proposition that segregation is an insult to African Americans: "Segregation does involve stigma the
community knows it does." Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 158 (1955). As a
result, segregation was wrong not because it psychologically harmed African Americans, but because
government was wrong to classify and treat people based on a suspect characteristic like race. Still,
other commentators, particularly Professor Derrick Bell, have asserted that Brown I should be
understood as a utilitarian opinion seeking to advance the collective interest ofwhite elites in American
society. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 25 (1980), reprinted in SHADES OFBROWN: NEWPERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 90,96 97 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980). In asserting this point ofview, Professor Bell notes
that the Court's opinion in Brown I-and the school desegregation it spawned-were particularly
helpful in assisting the United States in its struggle against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Id.;
see also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 79 114 (2000) (describing the connections between desegregation efforts in American
public education and the Cold War).
50. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493 95.
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like me. In contrast, Kennedy's justification in Parents Involved for the integration
of schools makes it clear that all students including the white students benefit
by recognizing that the strength of our country "comes from people of different
races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of al.'] I Thus, I
applaud Justice Kennedy for adopting the positive utilitarian justifications for
school integration. This reflects the culmination of our experience with school
desegregation, school integration, and affirmative action over the past fifty years.
Proponents of racial mixing in our public schools, colleges, and universities are
much more likely to tout the benefits of bringing together students from different
racial and ethnic backgrounds than they are to justify such efforts in terms of the
need to improve the deficient cultural environment of black students.
B. The Structure and Limitations of Constitutionally Acceptable Integration
Plans
Before discussing the structure and limitations of constitutionally acceptable
school integration plans, Justice Kennedy notes that while "[t]he statement by
Justice Harlan that '[o] ur Constitution is color-blind' was most certainly justified
in the context of his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson ..... And ... [the] axiom must
command our assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a
universal constitutional principal."5 2 Justice Kennedy provides two different paths
for public school authorities that want to consciously pursue school integration. He
gives them wide discretion to pursue it without employing individual racial
classifications of students.5 3 If these measures are inadequate, however, then Justice
Kennedy also allows for the limited use of individual racial classifications to
advance the compelling state interest of diversity as in Grutter v. Bollingers4  or
of preventing racial isolation."5
1. Racially Conscious Measures that Do Not Employ Individual Racial
ClassiJfications
Justice Kennedy stated that it is permissible for public school authorities "to
adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is
its racial composition."56 Thus, schools "are free to devise race-conscious measures
to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in
different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.,
5 7
Justice Kennedy then goes on to note that "[s]chool boards may pursue the goal of
[diversity] through ... strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance
51. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2788 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
52. Id. at 2791 92 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
overruled by Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483).
53. See id.
54. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
55. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 93 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in atargeted fashion;
and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race. '58 According
to Kennedy, "[these mechanisms are race conscious[,J but.., it is unlikely any of
them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.
5 9
Justice Kennedy's proposed mechanisms, when compared to Justice Roberts'
plurality opinion, are significant concessions to those who desire to pursue
integration policies. One of the concerns for school districts before Parents
Involved-a concern that would have remained had Justice Roberts been writing
a majority, rather than plurality, opinion-was the distinct possibility that measures
primarily motivated by the race-conscious objective of increasing school integration
could trigger strict scrutiny, even without employing racial classifications of
individual students.60 As Justice Kennedy indicated in his opinion, race-conscious
measures that do not employ individual racial classifications have been employed
for generations.6 Now, school authorities employing such measures can do so
"with confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur., 62 By removing this
concern, Justice Kennedy's opinion allows school authorities to consciously
attempt to produce as much integration as possible through means that eschew
individual racial classifications.
We can also view Justice Kennedy's comments in Parents Involved as a huge
concession over his prior opinions. Justice Kennedy authored the opinion of the
Court in the five-to-four decision in the congressional redistricting case of Miller
vJohnson.6" In Miller, Justice Kennedy applied strict scrutiny to a redistricting plan
created by the Georgia legislature that was motivated by the racially conscious
58. Id.
59. Id. It is also interesting to note that Justice Kennedy at this point quoted Bush v. Vera, which
stated, "Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of
race.... Electoral district lines are facially race neutral, so a more searching inquiry is necessary before
strict scrutiny can be found applicable in redistricting cases than in cases of classifications based
explicitly on race." Id. (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Justice Kennedy actually wrote a separate concurring opinion in Bush. See
Bush, 517 U.S. at 996 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring). One of the matters that he took issue with was the
meaning of this very part of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Kennedy stated,
I join the plurality opinion, but the statements in Part 11 of the opinion that
strict scrutiny would not apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority-
minority districts require comment. Those statements are unnecessary to our
decision, for strict scrutiny applies here. I do not consider these dicta to commit
me to any position on the question whether race is predominant whenever a State,
in redistricting, foreordains that one race be the majority in a certain number of
districts or in a certain part of the State.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
60. See, for example, in Grutter v. Bollinger, responding to the argument by the United States that
the law school could employ percentage plans recently adopted by public undergraduate institutions in
Texas, Florida, and California, Justice O'Connor's statement that "even assuming such plans are race-
neutral, they may preclude the university from conducting the individualized assessments necessary
to assemble a student body that is not just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by
the university." 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (emphasis added).
61. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
62. Id.
63. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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desire to produce a majority-minority congressional district.64 However, the
redistricting plan at issue in Miller did not employ systematic, individual typing of
race." Yet, when looking at this plan and concluding that it triggered strict scrutiny,
Justice Kennedy said the problem with assigning citizens to voting districts based
on race is that "[r]ace-based assignments 'embody stereotypes that treat individuals
as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts-their very worth
as citizens according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the
Constitution." '66 Justice Kennedy also noted that "[a]t the heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a
racial, religious, sexual or national class."6 Justice Kennedy actually compared the
drawing of boundary lines primarily motivated by race to the use of racial
classification in prior Supreme Court cases that involved the striking down of
segregation statutes and ordinances related to public parks, buses, golf courses,
beaches, and schools.68
Justice Kennedy's distinction between the use of racially conscious measures
to produce integrated schools and the use of measures that are not only racially
conscious but also employ racial classifications of individual students is a tenuous
one. In addition, this distinction requires public schools to engage in inefficient and
costly measures to pursue integration over what they could accomplish with a more
direct approach. Kennedy squarely faces this tenuous distinction and the arguable
irrationality of the distinction by posing several rhetorical questions that opponents
of this distinction would likely raise:
If it is legitimate for school authorities to work to avoid racial
isolation in their schools, must they do so only by indirection and
general policies? Does the Constitution mandate this inefficient
result? Why may the authorities not recognize the problem in
candid fashion and solve it altogether through resort to direct
64. Id. at 920. 1 am not arguing that Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved overrules his
opinion in Miller. There could be legitimate grounds to apply the Equal Protection Clause differently
in public schools than in voting. I have asserted in a number of articles that public education is sui
generis, and thus, the Equal Protection Clause should apply in a different way. See, e.g., Kevin Brown,
The Constitutionality of Racial Classifications in Public School Admissions, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 79
(2000) ("It is a mistake to view the use of racial classifications in public schools the same way that their
use would be viewed outside the context of public education."); Brown, supra note 21, at 1002 ("The
unique features of public education justify a different analysis for the use of race and ethnic
classification in public schools than it does outside of that context."). However, the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence could lend itself to the conclusion that a school system drawing school district boundary
lines motivated primarily by a desire to produce integrated public schools could trigger strict scrutiny
as well.
65. See Miller, 515 U.S. at917 20.
66. Id. at 912 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Conmm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)).
67. Id. at 911 (quoting Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
68. Id. (citing New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per
curiam) (public parks): Gaylev. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmesv. Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches); Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (schools)).
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assignments based on student racial classifications? So, the
argument proceeds, if race is the problem, then perhaps race is the
solution.6 9
Kennedy responds to these rhetorical questions and the last statement with a
rationale reminiscent of Justice Holmes' famous saying "The life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience."7 ° Justice Kennedy explained,
The argument ignores the dangers presented by individual
classifications, dangers that are not as pressing when the same
ends are achieved by more indirect means. When the government
classifies an individual by race, it must first define what it means
to be of a race. Who exactly is white and who is nonwhite? To be
forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent
with the dignity of individuals in our society. And it is a label that
an individual is powerless to change. Governmental
classifications that command people to march in different
directions based on racial typologies can cause a new
divisiveness. The practice can lead to corrosive discourse, where
race serves not as an element of our diverse heritage but instead
as a bargaining chip in the political process. On the other hand
race-conscious measures that do not rely on differential treatment
based on individual classifications present these problems to a
lesser degree.
The idea that if race is the problem, race is the instrument
with which to solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap
forward. And if this is a frustrating duality of the Equal
Protection Clause it simply reflects the duality of our history and
our attempts topromotefreedom in a world that sometimes seems
set against it. Under our Constitution the individual, child or
adult, can find his own identity, can define her own persona,
without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or
the color of her skin.7'
The justification for Justice Kennedy's distinction is that using racial
classifications of individual students to accomplish school integration is simply too
obvious. Kennedy's concern is the candor of employing efficient means to
accomplish the goal of school integration, not school integration itself. This is a
distinction that can be defended far more easily if it is defended based upon
experience rather than logic. It is also a distinction that I, regrettably, must confess
accords with my experience. It does not, however, accord with my experience or
that of so many black people dealing with our race. Blacks (and Hispanics) are
69. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. C. 2738, 2796 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
70. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW I (Little, Brown & Co. 1951) (1881).
71. Parents Involved, 127 S. CE at 2796-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (emphasis added).
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often treated and reacted to in our society as members of a racial or ethnic group.
In the affirmative action process, most underrepresented minorities are savvy and
experienced enough to recognize that our admissions to selective colleges,
universities, and graduate programs is based upon a calculation that considers our
abilities-as measured by "objective" academic credentials-and our race or
ethnicity. When we apply for jobs at accounting firms, law firms, or law schools,
we know that our race or ethnicity is a part of the judgment of our abilities.
Sometimes our race or ethnicity will help; at other times, it will be a burden. But
it almost always matters.
The principal concern of underrepresented minorities including me is not
being treated as members of a racial or ethnic minority, but being treated in a
negative manner because we are racial or ethnic minorities. It is not the denial of
individuality that is the harm; it is the fact that some person, some institution, or
some institutional practice has affirmatively disadvantaged us because we are
minorities. However, regardless of my experience as a black person dealing with
my race, my experience of interacting with and observing the experiences of so
many white people dealing with their race has clearly attuned me to the reality that
many whites are not accustomed to thinking of themselves as members of a racial
group. Many whites are much more likely to find the fact they are treated as a white
person, as opposed to an individual, demeaning. Thus, my experience of being a
black person tells me that it is negative treatment accorded to me because I am
black that is the harm. My experience also is that so many white people react to the
denial of their individuality when they are treated as being white as a harm in and
of itself. The distinction Justice Kennedy draws is irrational and illogical when
comprehended against my experience of being a black person. However, my
experience of observing and interacting with so many whites when they are being
treated as a member of a racial group tells me that Kennedy's distinction has merit.
2. Employing Individual Racial Classifications
If the exhaustion of racially conscious measures fails to produce an adequate
amount of integration, Justice Kennedy would then allow school authorities to
employ individual racial classifications in the pursuit of two distinct compelling
state interests. 72 Justice Kennedy notes that public school authorities could employ
"a more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics
that might include race as a component.",7' Thus, school authorities could use racial
classifications in an individualized admissions process as provided for in Grutter.
74
The criteria would be different than that in Grutter due to "the age of the students,
the needs of the parents, and the role of the schools. 75
Justice Kennedy also noted that "[t]his Nation has a moral and ethical
obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that
72. See id. at 2797 ("[M]easures other than differential treatment based on racial typing of
individuals first must be exhausted."). The two compelling government interests listed by Justice
Kennedy are the avoidance of racial isolation and the achievement of a diverse student population. Id.
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ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. 76 In the pursuit of this duty,
Justice Kennedy recognizes that "[a] compelling [state] interest exists in avoiding
racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may
choose to pursue.", 77 Professor Rachel Moran has pointed out that public school
officials do not even have to empirically demonstrate that avoiding racial isolation
is a tangible benefit.78 If public school officials want to use racial classifications to
end racial isolation, they can do so by declaring it an exercise of their discretion and
expertise regarding the best educational setting for their students.
According to Justice Kennedy, when public school authorities employ racial
classifications of individual students, they are limited to using them in a narrowly
tailored fashion to achieve the compelling state interest of producing the benefits
of diversity-as allowed in Grutter-or to avoid racial isolation. 7 9 In Grutter, the
University of Michigan Law School argued that in order to obtain the benefits of
racial and ethnic diversity, they had to enroll a "critical mass" of students from
minority groups that had historically been subjected to discrimination." The
concept of critical mass sets an upper limit on the consideration of race and
ethnicity in the public school assignment process.8 Professor Kent Syverud was a
professor at the University of Michigan Law School and is now dean of
Washington University School of Law. He testified before the district court,
indicating that "when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is
present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn there
is no 'minority viewpoint' but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority
students."82 Once a public school obtains a critical mass of underrepresented
minorities, its continued use of racial classifications is no longer narrowly tailored
to the compelling state interest. 83 Critical mass was defined by Jeffrey Lehman-the
Dean of the University of Michigan Law School at the time of Grutter as
"numbers such that underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like
spokespersons for their race."84 While a definite percentage cannot be given for
critical mass, there is evidence in Grutter to suggest that the percentage is between
76. Id. at 2797.
77. Id.
78. Professor Moran recently made the point at a recent symposium entitled "The School
Desegregation Cases and the Uncertain Future of Racial Equality," hosted by the Ohio State Law
Journal on February 21, 2008. For a web cast of Professor Moran's remarks, visit the journal's web site
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/lawjournal/symposium/index.php.
79. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
80. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315 16 (2003).
81. See id. at 342 ("[R]acial classifications, however compelling their goals, are potentially so
dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands."); Wessmann v.
Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 798 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the need for racial diversity was not a
compelling interestj ustifying racial classifications in the admissions process where "black and Hispanic
students together would [already] comprise between 15% and 20% of each entering class" under a
"strict merit-selection approach").
82. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319 20.
83. See Wessman, 160 F.3d at 798.
84. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318-19. Other school officials defined critical mass as "meaningful
representation" and "a number that encourages underrepresented minority students to participate in the
classroom and not feel isolated." Id. at 318 20.
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13.5% and 20%.85 In addition, the First Circuit in Wessman v. Gittens86 had the
occasion to address the percentage of underrepresented minorities necessary to
obtain the educational benefits of diversity for certain public high schools in
Boston.8" In so doing, the First Circuit noted,
Statistics compiled for the last ten years show that under a strict
merit-selection approach, black and Hispanic students together
would comprise between 15% and 20% of each entering class,
and minorities, in toto, would comprise a substantially greater
percentage. Even on the assumption that the need for racial and
ethnic diversity alone might sometimes constitute a compelling
interest sufficient to warrant some type of corrective
governmental action, it is perfectly clear that the need would have
to be acute much more acute than the relatively modest
deviations that attend the instant case.88
In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy does not say what percentage of a
particular racial group is needed in order to constitute a racially isolated school.
However, public school authorities may not need to establish through empirical
research the harm resulting from racially isolated schools. Therefore, it is unlikely
that a school will be considered racially isolated if the percentage of a minority
group whether black or Latino in a predominately white school, or white (or
perhaps Asian) in a predominately black or Latino school is greater than 15% to
20%. Thus, the compelling interest of preventing a school from being racially
isolated is likely to yield a similar upper limit on the percentage of students in the
school who are the racial or ethnic minority than will be yielded by a focus on
critical mass.
As noted earlier, 38% of black and 39% of Latino students attend public
schools where racial minorities constitute over 90% ofthe student population.89 The
benefits of diversity in Grutter focused on attracting students from minority
groups groups that had been historically discriminated against to the
predominantly white student body of the University of Michigan Law School.9"
Nevertheless, it would certainly seem that schools with predominately minority
student bodies could also avail themselves of the same rationale to attract white
(and maybe Asian) students to their schools. Beyond the diversity rationale, these
schools could also assert the compelling state interest of avoiding racially isolated
schools. However, candor requires us to note that it is unlikely that school
authorities will pursue integration plans employing racial classifications of
individual students with much enthusiasm or effect in schools with high
85. See id. at 336. The enrollment of underrepresented minority students in the University of
Michigan Law School ranged from 13.5% to 20.1% of the class between 1993 and 1998. Id. The
majority opinion did not raise any objection to these percentages as constituting a critical mass.
86. 160 F.3d 790.
87. 160F.3d at 791 94.
88. Id. at 798. It should also be noted that at the time of the case, black and Hispanic students
comprised 73% of the Boston public school students. Id. at 798 n.4.
89. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 29, at 33 tbl.14, 35 tbl.17.
90. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315 16.
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concentrations of minority students. The reason is not based in logic, but in fifty
years of experience with school desegregation and integration. That experience
strongly indicates that white parents will not send their children to these schools in
any significant numbers. A brief review of the history of school desegregation will
elucidate this reality.
All of us familiar with the school desegregation process are familiar with the
concepts of "white flight"'" and the "tipping point,"92 as well as their implications
for school desegregation and integration. During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the
Supreme Court and our country were rudely introduced to the reality that whites
who object to their children being part of a desegregation remedy and have the
resources will often decide to "flee" the school system by sending their children to
private schools or by choosing to move to another community. With one of the
companion cases 93 to Green v. County School Board,94 where the Supreme Court
emphatically announced that the obligation of school districts that had once
operated dual school systems was to desegregate and to do it now, 95 the Court was
compelled to address the issue of white flight. In Monroe v. Board of
Commissioners, 96 the Court addressed a desegregation plan for the threejunior high
schools in Jackson, Tennessee. 97 Two of the schools were formerly all-white
schools and one was formerly all black.9" The school district initially assigned
students to the neighborhood schools; however, they were allowed to transfer to
other schools. 99 The result was that the white students assigned to the black schools
generally sought transfers to the former all-white schools.'1° Three years after the
approval by the district court of the school district's attendance zones for the j unior
91. Scholarly studies in the 1970s studying the impact of white flight followed the publication of
JAMES S. COLEMAN, SARA D. KELLY & JOHN A. MOORE, TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1968 73
(1975) (concluding that the decline in white enrollments in schools in heavily black inner cities is
significantly accelerated when desegregation occurs, especially where white suburbs exist). For a survey
of the ensuing controversy, see David J. Armor, White Flight and the Future of School Desegregation,
in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 187, 187 96 (Walter G. Stephan & Joe R.
Feagin eds. 1980); Thomas F. Pettigrew & Robert L. Green, School Desegregation in Large Cities: A
Critique of the Coleman "White Flight" Thesis, 46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (1976); Christine H. Rossell,
Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say About the Effectiveness of Desegregation Plans.",
12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 80 94 (1983).
92. The phenomena of"tipping point" was noted by Morton Grodzins in 1957 when he indicated
that for the vast majority of white Americans there exists an upper limit of minority enrollment in their
children's schools that they can tolerate with about 20% being the tipping point in some East Coast
cites. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 302 (2006).
93. The companion cases were Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 (1968), and
Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
94. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
95. See id. at 411-42.
96. 391 U.S. 450.
97. See id. at 452 56. While the case presented to the Supreme Court involved only the three
junior high schools in Jackson, "the plan in its application to elementary and senior high schools [was]
also necessarily implicated since the right of free transfer extend[ed] to pupils at all levels." Id. at 456.
98. Id. at 482.
99. Id. at 453 54.
100. See id. at 457 ("Not one of the considerable number of white pupils in the middle and
northern parts of the Merry zone assigned there under the attendance zone aspect of the plan chose to
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high schools, no white student was attending the formerly all-black school.'' The
school district frankly asserted in its brief to the Supreme Court that without the
transfer option, it feared that the white students would "flee the school system
altogether."''0 2 The Supreme Court responded by quoting Brown v. Board of
Education °3 (Brown II): "But it should go without saying that the vitality of these
constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement
with them."'0 4 The Court, discussing the issue of white flight four years later in
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education,0 5 stated that while white
flight "may be cause for deep concern.... it cannot... be accepted as a reason for
achieving anything less than complete uprooting of the dual public school
system."' 06
In his path-breaking article back in 1983, Professor Paul Gewirtz noted,
The degree to which white flight occurs in a school system
depends upon the proportion of black enrollment in the schools as
well as other variables. If the proportion of blacks in the schools
is greater than some "tipping point," it is commonly believed that
white flight significantly escalates, and the schools may become
or remain identifiably black. A tipping point has typically been
estimated to occur when the proportion of blacks is between
twenty-five and fifty percent .... 0'
Despite the statements by the Supreme Court about white flight, lower courts
fashioning desegregation remedies were also driven by Supreme Court mandates
that stated the following: "The constitutional command to desegregate schools does
not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial
composition of the school system as a whole";'08 the existence of a small number
of one-race or virtually one-race schools within a school district does not mean that
the remedy is constitutionally inadequate.0 9 The true object of the desegregation
remedy is to achieve the maximum amount of desegregation possible." ' 0 Therefore,
"[w]hile the fear of white flight cannot be accepted as a reason for not acting, the
court may elect a constitutionally permissible plan calculated to minimize white
boycotts."' Recognizing the impact that white flight can have on the effectiveness
101. Id. Only 7 black students were attending one of the formerly all-white schools, and the
student body of the second formerly all-white school had 349 white children and 135 black children.
Id.
102. Id. at 459.
103. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown If), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
104. Id. (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
106. Id. at 491.
107. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 629-30 (1983).
108. Swami v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
109. Id. at 26.
110. Seeid
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of a remedial plan is nothing more than recognizing that there is a difference
between catering to bias and seeking to minimize patron resistance.112
What the foregoing suggests is that, based on our experience with school
desegregation and integration, not many white parents will eagerly send their
children to racially isolated schools with a predominantly minority student body.
In practice, Kennedy's limitation on employing racial classifications of individual
students' constitutionalizes the school desegregation and integration phenomena
of white flight and the tipping point. The tipping point sets an upper limit to the
proportion of black (and other underrepresented minority) students who can attend
a predominantly white school in order to obtain stable integration of that school's
student body. Thus, the type of school where the use of racial classifications will
be effective is that in which the student body is at least 80% to 85% white (or
maybe white and Asian). In fact, the percentage of white (or maybe white and
Asian) students is likely to be even higher because these percentages would be
approaching the critical mass or racial isolation limits. Such public schools are the
only ones that have the largely homogenous racial makeup necessary to use
individual racial classifications. It will also be necessary for the public school
officials to believe in the utilitarian benefits of diversity and the idea that the
strength of our nation "comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures
uniting in commitment to the freedom of all.""' 4 If school authorities do not so
believe, then they will not be interested in adopting a school integration plan using
individual racial classifications in the first place. These communities will be
composed of an overwhelming number of white students, white parents, and white
voters who will have to agree that the limited use of racial classifications is
beneficial for white students. If the white community does not support the limited
use of racial classifications, they will be able to resort to the political process and
easily defeat these types of plans by voting the offending school board members or
other governmental officials out of office.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Kennedy's opinion embodies the American experience of what we have
learned through fifty years of school desegregation and integration. He does not
write as one who is considering school integration while staring up into blue skies
with a bright yellow sun. He does not write as one hearing trumpets blowing from
the heavens that are heralding the dawn of a new and wonderful day. Justice
Kennedy knows that as a country we are not novices at school integration
embarking on a bold adventure of the American spirit with our typical optimism
112. The Eighth Circuit recognized this difference in Clark v. Board of Education, 705 F.2d 265
(8th Cir. 1983), when it held that a lower court may reduce the black population in some integrated
schools thereby maintaining a number of all-black schools in order to prevent white flight and
stabilize the integration process in a system that was 65% black. See id. at 269 73; Adams v. United
States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1291-97 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that a desegregation plan need not reassign
additional black children to schools with at least 30% black enrollment to prevent white flight in a
school system with 75% black enrollment, even though all-black schools remain).
113. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 93
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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and hubris. Rather, we are seasoned veterans who have come to realize that we
cannot achieve everything we desire. Justice Kennedy is the sober and somber
voice at the funeral that says, "I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.""' 5 When
it comes to school desegregation and integration, fifty years of experience
adequately demonstrates to us that there are limits as to what American society is
prepared to do at this time. What Justice Kennedy does is constitutionalize the
limits of school integration that reflect our experience over the past two
generations. Justice Kennedy allows public school authorities to produce as much
integration as they can, without unduly upsetting the sensibilities of white students,
white parents, and white voters.
Justice Kennedy's position cannot help but call to mind the prescient
memorandum written by then-law clerk William Rehnquist, arguing against the
Supreme Court overturning Plessy v. Ferguson"6 in its opinion in BrownI.117 In his
memorandum, Rehnquist asserted the following:
One hundred and fifty years of attempts on the part of this Court
to protect minority rights of any kind ... have all met the same
fate. One by one the cases establishing such rights have been
sloughed off, and crept silently to rest. If the present Court is
unable to profit by this example, it must be prepared to see its
work fade in time, too, as embodying only the sentiments of a
transient majority of nine men."'
115. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2, 1.71, in THE NORTON
SHAKESPEARE: BASED ON THE OXFORD EDITION 1533, 1565 (Stephen Greenblatt et al. eds., 1997).
116. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
117. See 347 U.S. 483,494 95 (1954).
118. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION AND
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